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To identify ways to strengthen the MRC, ������ϲʿ�������ֳ�ֱ�� has drafted a study that compares the Mekong Agreement with the UN Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (1992 Water Convention) and the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997 Watercourses Convention), collectively known as the UN global water conventions. The preliminary findings were presented at workshops in Bangkok and Phnom Penh in September 2024, with participation from the UN Water Convention Secretariat, government agencies, UN agencies, NGOs, civil society organisations and universities. 

At the workshop, participants recognised the gaps and weaknesses in the Mekong Agreement, which places key protocols outside the body of the agreement and includes a vague and circular dispute resolution mechanism. A weak agreement reflects, some argued, the principle of non-interference that characterises international relations in ASEAN. 

Historically, the Mekong countries have preferred decision-making by consensus - the so-called "Mekong spirit of cooperation". But the consensus-based approach is showing its limits as rapid economic growth drives competition over the Mekong. 

The workshop’s discussion showed the need to distinguish non-interference versus non-confrontation. If country A has legitimate concerns that a dam in country B could damage its fisheries, country A should be entitled under international law to express its concerns to country B and seek a solution. This is diplomacy at play, not confrontation. In fact, in the long term, the inability of the MRC to address the legitimate concerns of member countries increases the likelihood of confrontation. 

The ������ϲʿ�������ֳ�ֱ�� study concludes that accession by the MRC member countries to the UN global water conventions would reinforce, and not replace, the Mekong Agreement. The two conventions would act as a complementary framework, filling legal gaps while in no way conflicting with the Mekong Agreement. For example, the conventions include precise, time-bound steps to resolve disagreements. And whereas the MRA only covers the Mekong mainstream, the conventions cover the entire river basin.  

The study acknowledges that this will take time and proposes a “try before you buy” approach whereby countries can seek to engage with the 1992 Water Convention’s community of practice on transboundary water management to assess the costs and benefits of accession. Should a country wish to accede, they could do so with the support of the Secretariat and other Parties. 

Viet Nam acceded to the 1997 Watercourses Convention in 2014 (which triggered its entry into force) but remains the only ASEAN country to have done so. A major reason for the lack of progress is that the 1997 Watercourses Convention provides no practical support to parties. The 1992 Water Convention, on the other hand, has an active , a dynamic institutional framework, and a Program of Work to support governments on transboundary water cooperation, including task forces on water and climate and on water-food-energy nexus assessments. This is one reason why 55 countries have acceded to the 1992 Water Convention with over 20 more in process. 

At the workshops, government officials from Finland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe each explained why their countries respectively acceded to one or both UN conventions. A key point is that accession indicates that a country is willing to be bound by international law, which increases investor confidence and opportunities for foreign investment. It was also observed that transboundary cooperation over water encourages cooperation in other sectors, such as trade.  

Participants stated that transboundary cooperation depends heavily on political will. This raises the question: does good law build political will or does political will build good law? Finland’s experience is instructive. In 1964 it signed a transboundary water treaty with the USSR. This treaty has withstood the tensions of the Cold War, the breakup of the USSR, and most recently the conflict in Ukraine. It shows that countries with very different political and economic systems and, in Finland’s words, “even with a very unfair and difficult starting point”, can still cooperate on transboundary waters. 

Without re-opening the Mekong Agreement, effective cooperation over the Mekong would benefit from member countries engaging actively with the UN water conventions. The MRC's development partners, nine of which have acceded to the 1992 Water Convention, can play a crucial role in helping the member countries to do so.